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A Relationship of Pivots: Philippine-US Cooperation in a
Changing World
Abstract
As one of the few nations in the world (and the only one in the vicinity of China) to be a
former colony of the United States, the Philippines is in a unique position on the world
stage. This article delineates the history of the complex relationship between the
Philippines and the United States since the Spanish-American war while placing an
emphasis on modern relations. Since its independence to the end of the Cold War, the
Philippines was unequivocally an ally to the United States, though this did not stop tensions
from mounting. As China's contemporary foreign policy fosters further amicability between
it and the Philippines under the Belt and Road Initiative, this has given rise to worries of a
potential pivot to China. Furthermore, hostile sentiments conveyed from certain facets of
the Philippines’ leadership towards the United States accelerate these concerns. This
article delves into the current relationship between the Philippines and the United States
while outlining avenues for further cooperation via mutual benefit, particularly within the
realm of developmental assistance.
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Introduction
In 2017, various sources (most notably from the private-sector) announced
the foundations of a new megacity project in the Philippines —The City of
Pearl.1 Named after the antiquated nickname for Manila as “the pearl of
the orient,” this proposed urban center is set to be anything but a reminder
of the past. Purportedly hosting the likes of golf courses, sports stadiums,
and high rises—all intertwined with artificial intelligence creating a “smart
city.”2 The project was set to involve 407 hectares of mostly reclaimed land
off the bay of Manila. Though the project is by no means unilateral, the
chief architectural firm regarding its construction is Hong Kong-based
company—Ho and Partners Architects Engineers & Development
Consultants Limited. Meanwhile, the chief construction firm is UAA
Kinming Development Corporation, a Manila-based company created
solely for the city's development, but with heavy involvement from the
Hong Kong-based Kho Group and a “major Chinese state-owned
conglomerate named ‘mother company.’”3
A similar incipit project in the Philippines is that of New Clark City, a
green-smart megacity of similar scale to The City of Pearl but without any
focus on land reclamation or coastal proximity.4 Though these two projects
are not exclusively funded through Chinese sources, they may easily be
considered as extensions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since their
respective unveilings, the level of development regarding both projects has
underperformed expectations, inviting worry from observers. These
sentiments may be stemming from the rapid development of projects in
the same vicinity, such as Forest City Johor in Malaysia or International
City in Sri Lanka.
Despite differences in levels of development, lead architect of The City of
Pearl, Nicholas Ho, has stated that it is his goal to complete the city "in
seven phases over 20 years.”5 With longer timetables, worry regarding
stagnation and falling short on benchmarks when compared to other BRI
projects become less salient. Though maritime disputes and worries
regarding employment have created tension between Manila and Beijing
in recent years, bilateral agreements in the name of investment and
development reign strong between the two nations as cooperation
accelerates.
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Ever extending cooperation between China and the Philippines may foster
fears that relations between the United States and the Philippines are set
to deteriorate. Relations between the two countries had certainly begun to
sour within the past decade, with one prominent example being the
attempted annulment of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) by the
Duterte administration.6 The claim that this potential annulment signifies
a major pivot away from the United States and towards China is reductive,
however. The immense history that the Philippines and the United States
share as allies and current linkages of cooperation may serve to bolster
their mutual friendship. As the grandiosity of Philippine-US relations
carries profound implications on both countries, it is imperative that the
United States engage further with such matters, rather than pursuing a
more distant approach.

History of Philippine-U.S. Relations
Initially colonized by the Spanish Empire in the 16th century under the rule
of King Philip II (hence the namesake), the Philippine Islands had its
ownership transferred to the United States of America following the
Spanish-American war of 1898.7 Rather than holistically taking the
Philippines as “spoils of war,” the United States purchased the islands and
eliminated the nascent republic that had formed in the short period
following Spain's absence. The Philippines would remain a colony of the
United States until after the conclusion of World War II in 1946. Though
the United States and the Philippines presently support bilateral
cooperation, the treatment of the Philippines as an American colony was
largely one of exploitation, marring prospects for development.
Examples of this exploitation include an emphasis on profitability for
individuals of American origin at the expense of Filipino natives, stamping
out calls for democracy, and utilizing a media campaign that “defin[ed]
Filipino identity as savage”.8 It is impossible to undo the adversity inflicted
on the Philippines by colonial practices, but it is not only possible—yet also
advisable—for the prospects of bilateral cooperation that future measures
placate the wellbeing of the people of the Philippines as well. Following the
nation's independence in 1946, Manila and Washington formed an alliance
that was contingent upon mutual defense.9 The 1951 Mutual Defense
Agreement (MDA) between the two countries, affirming that one would
support the other if an attack was to take place, solidified the alliance
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between the two nations.10 Against the backdrop of the Cold War, where
the specter of war was ever prominent, the MDA cemented the Philippines
as not only a U.S. ally —but a close one. The MDA remains in place today,
with its resilience serving as an analog for the resilience of friendship
between the two nations. Despite being signed over 70 years ago, the MDA
carries prominence to today with Anthony Blinken under the Biden
administration vocally reaffirming U.S. commitment to the agreement in
2021.11
In regards to economics, the Philippines Statistics Authority shows that
yearly investment from the United States has fluctuated within the past 10
years, peaking at roughly $80 billion under the Obama administration,
dropping to figures ranging from $10 billion to $30 billion under the
Trump administration, and now surpassing the $30 billion figure with an
upward trajectory under the Biden administration.12 Meanwhile, according
to data concerning foreign trade on census.gov, annual exports to the
Philippines have hovered near $8 billion and annual imports have risen
from $9 billion to $12 billion since 2011 to 2020; figures in 2021 were $9
billion for exports and $14 billion for imports, revealing another upward
trend.13 The presence of the United States as a large stakeholder in the
Philippine economy as well as trends of increasing investment highlight
the importance of cooperation between the two countries. These factors
also underline the current outlook of increased interaction between the
two countries. However, the emergence of China in the Belt and Road
Initiative may come to rival the United States’ place.

History of China-Philippine Relations
The United States has certainly had a closer relationship with the
Philippines for the past century, but China's history with the nation
extends much further into the past. As early as the Song Dynasty, the
Chinese Empire and the Philippines retained significant levels of maritime
trade.14 Under Spanish rule, trade between the Philippines and China
expanded greatly due to the opening of new trade routes. As economic
interaction between China and the Philippines flourished, so did cultural
interaction, thus intertwining the two in a manner that the United States
could never partake in.
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Under the contemporary world order of the Cold War, the Philippines had
chosen the side of the United States, thus brewing hostility between it and
Communist China prior to the Sino-Soviet split. After the split, relations
between the two countries changed with a newfound fondness, signaled by
increased trade.15 This amicability still was not enough to divorce the
Philippines from the American sphere of influence, however. Upon the end
of the Cold War, the absence of the Soviet Union led to the proliferation of
the notion that ideological blocs and international camps were no longer
necessary in conducting global politics. Under this novel sentiment, China
could bolster its ties with nations such as the Philippines and it would do
little to disrupt the contemporary geopolitical order. Barring the past
decade, the gradual bolstering of relations between China and the
Philippines reached its apex in 2007 during the visit of Chinese premier
Wen Jiabao, under what Philippine President Macapagal-Arroyo declared
as the “golden age of partnership.”16

United States Development Efforts in the Philippines
In the context of American rebuilding efforts after an immensely
destructive World War II, the Europe-focused Marshall Plan stands as the
most salient. In 1946, Washington enacted a similar plan in the
Philippines under the name Bell Trade Act, which secured $800 million in
funds to rebuild the Philippines and lay down the groundwork for future
prosperity. This act was not without its strings, however, as it effectively
forced the Philippines to surrender much of its national sovereignty.
Under this act, the United States boasted far more control over the
Philippines’ currency exchange rate and gave preferential treatment to
American businesses, with one contemporary suggesting that “the United
States is actually in a stronger position in the Philippines although the
islands are independent now.”17 The predatory nature of this act was
lessened extensively upon its revision with the Laurel-Langley agreement
of 1955, lasting up until 1974, giving a more just (though still far from
perfect) share of prosperity to the archipelago.18
One obstacle in further cooperation has long been the limit of foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines to 40 percent, among other
restrictions.19 Though this restriction may act as a barrier on the premises
regarding profitability for outside investors, there is a clear justification for
the contentious nature of the Philippines’ actions towards maintaining
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national sovereignty. Despite Washington currently lacking with physical
infrastructure investment in the Philippines, the advancement of
electronic infrastructure (particularly regarding the establishment of 5G)
poses itself as a prominent linkage.
With the 2019 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum, of which the United States was an observer, it was noted in a
formal dialogue that “[t]hree main partners have emerged for ASEAN to
help strengthen cybersecurity: Japan, the United States, and the European
Union.”20 Additionally, the United States and a large Philippine
telecommunications firm signed an agreement for a $1 million contract
regarding the expansion of 5G, a staple of a possible emergent trend
between the two nations.21 As the Philippines transitions into an uppermiddle-income economy, access to the internet for the majority of citizens
is a certain eventuality and one that must be met with meticulous planning
of potential infrastructure, further highlighting the importance of
concerted efforts.
Moreover, cooperation has also emerged in the realm of vaccinations for
the 2019 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). Despite China's global reach of
Sinovac vaccines and the Philippines’ integration in the BRI, the United
States has taken the lead in distributing vaccines with over 33.3 million
given through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access program as of March
2022.22 Finally, according to the United States Agency for International
Development, levels of humanitarian aid also remain high, with a figure of
$4.5 billion total assistance with the official goal of development.23

China-Philippine Relations in the Modern Era
In 2013, Beijing announced the One Belt One Road Initiative. As of today,
the One Belt One Road Initiative has largely transformed into the Belt and
Road Initiative, or BRI. Given its proximity, one of the BRI's largest
regions of focus is Southeast Asia. Yearly investment from China to the
Philippines has fluctuated during the past 5 years from below $10 billion
to almost $90 billion, and the most recent figure is resting at $15 billion.24
Trade figures between China and the Philippines have an upward
trajectory however, with total bilateral trade reaching almost $50 billion
with an annualized growth rate of roughly 17 percent over the past 5
years.25 Such cooperation is not universal, however, as the initial period of
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the BRI was marred by a new development between China and the
Philippines—a territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Affirmations
from Beijing regarding China's historic maritime claims to the Spratley
Islands upset officials in the Philippines as these claims encroached
directly upon its sovereign territory. China did not budge on the issue,
however, and the case was eventually settled in The Hague under a
tribunal determined by the United Nations Convention for the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).26 After three years of heavy deliberation, the tribunal
determined that China did not have rightful jurisdiction over these islands,
but the ruling was vehemently rejected by Chinese officials who claimed it
to be an “external provocation.”27
Despite the increasing tensions, in 2017 (one year after Duterte’s
inauguration), the Philippines’ partnership in the BRI was “affirmed and
welcomed” by Chinese officials.28 Accompanied with this partnership came
a slew of BRI projects that have not ceased in its reach, with more
prominent ones being the aforementioned City of Pearl and New Clark
City. As a result of new BRI projects, many fear a phenomenon in which
Beijing pursues infrastructure projects with the goal of crippling the target
country with debt and therefore gaining large sums of equity in its
markets, a form of neo-colonialism known colloquially as debt-trap
diplomacy. The existence of debt-trap diplomacy is a controversial matter,
though what is not is the existence of fears surrounding the phenomenon,
and it is evident that such fears may go on to shape further interactions
between Philippine and Chinese officials.
As a democracy, public sentiment bears importance in the Philippines’
politics, and the unpopularity of China does little to support relations
between the two countries (despite contemporary President Duterte's
positive sentiments). Furthermore, an influx of migrant workers from
mainland China has accompanied an influx of investment as well. There is
no issue with this premise alone, but conflict arises due to the externality
that “Chinese investors preferred to employ Chinese workers in order to
overcome the language barrier.”29 Unfortunately, such developments in
the Philippine job market (combined with disputes in the South China
Sea) have cultivated a level of Sinophobia that currently afflicts Filipinos of
Chinese descent (commonly known as Tsinoys) and recent mainland
immigrants alike.
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Internal Politics of the Philippines Regarding Development
The Build Build Build (BBB) program from the Duterte administration
seeks to accelerate the already extant growth found in the nation's recent
history. This project goes hand in hand with the Philippine Development
Plan (PDP), and though it is not without its flaws, these internal efforts
have enjoyed great success. The Philippines’ modern economy's faculties
that provide strong bases for foreign direct investment (FDI) are reflected
in its gross domestic product growth from 2012 to 2019, consistently
achieving figures between 6 percent and 7 percent.30 “The Philippines has
moved in recent years to liberalize several sectors of the economy to
simulate foreign direct investment,” thus opening the door for investment
from other countries, most notably the United States, China, and Japan.31
As internal politics may play a role of gatekeeping or possibly guiding
prospective investment, it may be prudent to promote potential projects
that do more to uplift the general populous. As shown in a working paper
dissecting the machinations of the BBB initiative from the Philippine
Institute of Development Studies, there is a distinct lack of “PDP targets in
the area of social infrastructure (e.g., [sic] school buildings and health
facilities),” highlighting a potential area to focus U.S. efforts.32 Additional
suggested types of investment include those concerning environmental
sustainability with goals of reducing pollution and mitigating climate
change. The official website for the BBB program boasts lofty promises,
among which are reducing poverty by 25 percent by 2022 and making
infrastructure a top priority of the government.33 Though these ideals may
be little more than campaign promises from Duterte, clear positive
sentiments towards development from the nation's leadership bodes well
for the future of interconnectivity and globalization for the Philippines.
In June of 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. succeeded Rodrigo Duterte as
President.34 The Marcos Jr. platform largely boasts a continuation of
Duterte’s policies (as made evident by his comments on Duterte’s style of
governance as well as his Vice-Presidential candidate being Duterte’s
daughter).35 While these reasons point to a continuation of pro-China
rhetoric, the Marcos Jr. platform is much more flexible than Duterte’s and
popular support for cooperation between Washington and Manila may
reflect in future policies, furthering prospects for U.S. engagement.
Though Duterte’s exit from the presidency may prelude fundamental
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changes in Manila’s patterns of governance, Marcos Jr.’s status as the son
of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. casts dubious prospects on
potential amelioration of democracy and consequently further
disincentivizes U.S. distancing.

Obstacles to Overcome
One reason Chinese investment through the BRI is creating such a grand
impact is its larger scale when compared to U.S. investment. Currently,
Chinese investment in the Philippines dwarfs American investment due to
a combination of action from Beijing and a lack of action from
Washington. In 2019, the Trump administration unveiled the Blue Dot
Network, placing a figurative blue dot on greenlit projects that met
sustainability goals and promoted good governance in recipient countries.
The budget of this initiative for the entirety of Indo-Pacific is $60 billion,
which is simply not enough when compared to other actors in the region
(not only China, but countries like Japan as well).36 The Blue Dot Network
has since joined the Biden administration’s Build Back Better World
(B3W) initiative, largely remaining in its original functionality.
As the Philippines and the United States have enjoyed an alliance for much
of the past century, complacency and insularity from the American side in
the face of a more open Philippines is perhaps the largest obstacle to
overcome. Vocal remarks, often directly from Duterte himself, were the
most prominent indicator of cracks in the relationship between the United
States and the Philippines, beginning shortly after his inauguration in
June of 2016. Later that year, Duterte expressed interest to “break up with
America,” along with several disparaging expletives directed at U.S.
President Barack Obama.37 These comments, accompanied with the
initiation of the process for abrogation for the VFA between the two
nations in 2020, painted a bleak picture of deteriorating relations.
However, Duterte has largely refrained from such crass remarks against
American officials in recent years, meanwhile, Manila has restored the
VFA shortly after its suspension with new terms.38 With the potential for
future cooperation being so great, Washington should view hiccups and
obstacles as challenges to overcome, rather than deterrents.

Past U.S. Administrations’ Relationships with the Philippines
and Trajectory Under Biden
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Despite Duterte’s history of animosity towards Washington, the Obama
administration largely held on to aims of keeping the Philippines as an
ally. As it has continuously been emblematic of U.S. policy to support
democracy abroad and not mar friendships of nations in a region as
pivotal as Southeast Asia, the U.S. side has done little to further destabilize
the relationship between the two countries. Prior to Duterte, Obama and
former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III had cooperated
extensively. The most prominent of this cooperation was the bifurcated
effort in economic cooperation (mainly through the Partnership for
Growth) and cooperation in national security (primarily through the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement).39 While Duterte’s profane
remarks against Obama led the U.S. President to cancel a planned
meeting, the relationship between the two leaders was restored during the
2016 ASEAN summit after they had a chance to properly get acquainted
with one another.40
Under the Trump administration, the allyship between Manila and
Washington had changed profoundly. As both Trump and Duterte
facilitated a base of right-wing populism, forwarding dogma against
perceived threats such as immigration and the drug trade, there was some
apparent congruence in policies. However, these styles of governance by
way of promoting nationalistic rhetoric proved harmful to international
cooperation, a trend exacerbated by a continuation of Duterte’s actions.
Decreased economic engagement was tantamount to a perceived cessation
of the VFA, to which Trump responded with approval and a compliment
towards Duterte’s leadership.41
The Biden administration has marked a significant change in trajectory as
seen by the diminishing of isolationist policies. The Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance document, published in 2021, details the
Biden administration’s views pertaining to foreign policy, placating prodemocratic and anti-isolationist positions.42 Though the document does
not explicitly name the Philippines, it does name members of ASEAN and
prioritizes them for deepened cooperation. This document also details the
importance of protecting democratic governance abroad and its
proliferation. As fears of democratic backsliding persist within the Marcos
Jr. regime, increased levels of congruence could bolster democracy in the
Philippines.43 It is under this framework that closer ties with the
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Philippines are not only compatible within the Biden administration’s
goals, but complementary to them.
Finally, the state.gov website on November 16th of 2021 published an
official press release was published detailing a Joint Vision for a 21st
Century United States-Philippines Partnership. This press release detailed
current desires for greater cooperation with the Philippines through aims
such as shared prosperity, legitimizing a laws-based maritime order, and
enhancing the extant security architecture in the region.44 Given these
documents, it is evident that the current U.S. administration under Biden
seeks a stronger partnership with the Philippines.

Advantages and Mechanisms of Greater Economic Engagement
The increased economic engagement from the United States towards the
Philippines may precipitate through increasing the ease of access for
investments (as well as incentives for these investments) and increasing
investment directly from U.S. government institutions. While there are
many applicable institutions towards this end, the two most pertinent are
the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation. Though current investment efforts are
in place, particularly concerning the previously mentioned $60 billion
through the B3W initiative, this amount encompasses the entire IndoPacific region.45 Given the potential for an imbalance of investment in the
region, it would be prudent to set investment goals for the Philippines in
particular. This increased cooperation would enhance the ties between
Washington and Manila as well as bolster the Philippines’ economic
infrastructure. Added economic infrastructure would lead to increased
gross domestic product and lead to lower prices for goods as volume would
increase along with capacity for manufacturing, creating better outcomes
for American consumers as well.46
Furthermore, advancements in manufacturing infrastructure in the
Philippines detracts leverage from China as a manufacturing hegemon and
makes the United States less reliant on them. Through policies such as
Made in China 2025, there is a clear focus within Beijing’s governance to
diminish its dependence on other countries, highlighting a phenomenon
where China becomes less reliant on the world, but the world remains
reliant on China.47 This phenomenon spells out a mismatch of leverage
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between the United States and China regarding trade negotiations, but
greater economic involvement in other countries—namely the
Philippines—could counter rising influence from Beijing. As the
relationship that the United States has with the Philippines is far friendlier
than with China, the Philippines’ prospective role as a regional
manufacturing hub bodes well for trade between the two countries.
Additionally, economic investment does not need to only encompass
manufacturing as there is great potential for a comprehensive approach,
incorporating other fields such as the service sector and tech.48 In
summation, increased economic cooperation between the United States
and the Philippines give both nations increased leverage in the global
economy, improves the domestic market for both, and sets the
groundwork for an enhanced mutually beneficial friendship.

Advantages of Greater Military Cooperation in a Geopolitical
Context
As China gains more influence in Southeast Asia through the BRI, the
influence of the United States is ostensibly waning. Increased military
cooperation between the United States and the Philippines would directly
undermine this perception. In Southeast Asia, a region rife with
democratic backsliding, the image of United States influence waning
would only exacerbate this trend. Another benefit of greater military
cooperation is advancement in both countries’ wars on terrorism, as
counterterrorism efforts have often been a catalyst for past engagement.49
Terrorism in the region of Southeast Asia primarily takes two forms:
Pirates and Islamic extremists. Piracy has established itself as a salient
issue in the vicinity, with prominence in the Sulu Sea, the body of water
that surrounds the southern half of the Philippines.50 Piracy in Southeast
Asia has declined in recent years, but the extant state of it harms prospects
of the safety of human lives as well as shipping lanes in the region.51
Greater involvement from the United States can accelerate this decline,
mitigating risk and enhancing cooperation.
Furthermore, the Islamic State’s presence in the Philippine province of
Mindanao and history of terrorist attacks highlight a pressing issue in the
region as well as a clear intersection with the U.S.’ war on terror.52 Finally,
the most effective manner to enforce legal norms is through precedence,
and increased military presence would enhance the legitimacy of
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territorial boundaries as established in international law. Where this
concept is pertinent is the case of the South China Sea as the current U.S.
administration has explicitly recognized the 2016 UNCLOS ruling against
China’s claims in the region (as made evident in the November 2021
document).53 Even if the Duterte regime did not express much interest in
the ruling (and if this perspective continues under Marcos Jr.), the
contentious nature of this subject paired with the Philippines’ democratic
foundations prelude a potential future administration where it will.
Increased involvement would not only assist in the legitimacy of this
ruling but for the foundations of the global rules-based maritime order
that the seas are contingent on, providing a basis of regional security.
Consequences of Potential Distancing and Drawbacks of Cooperation
There is a fundamental question as to whether an enhanced partnership
between Washington and Manila is worth the potential downsides.
Though the advantages are vast, the disadvantages exist to an extent and
deserve acknowledgement to achieve a holistic view on the subject. The
most conspicuous disadvantage is the potential for economic loss. The
nature of investment pursues returns (in addition to recuperation) but
investing in developing economies always carry extra risk. If investment is
to be processed as Official Development Assistance, then the potential for
return is lessened, but the terms of these loans create a more
advantageous situation for the Philippines and its economy.54 Despite this
notion, investing in developing economies (even when prioritizing facets
such as capacity building and sustainability) have been consistently shown
to be “safe investment vehicles.”55
Moreover, the Philippines’ role as a burgeoning economy while reliance on
China decreases bodes well concerning prospective advancement. Pitfalls
are inevitable in this respect, but the potential for mutual economic gain,
advancements in positions of leverage, and the decreased threat of piracy
make cooperation a net positive. Another possible criticism of
contemporary efforts regarding cooperation is perceived adulation of
Duterte/ Marcos Jr. and an erosion of democratic principles. However, an
abandonment of the Philippines as a country due to this erosion would
only more so push the nation towards China, a regional hegemon with
little respect for democracy. Duterte’s attitude towards China is not
permanent, and neither are current lapses in democratic governance. As
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Marcos Jr. succeeds Duterte, new policies and alterations towards the
Philippines’ government are on the horizon. Given these developments, a
closer relationship with the United States as a proponent of democracy
creates the best hope for the proliferation of such ideals.

Conclusion and the Path Forward
Internal politics and contemporary economic frameworks from Manila
characterize an inclination towards global interconnectivity and FDI.
Though disparaging remarks from the Duterte administration have arisen,
investment through internal and external means maintains a distinguished
goal of Manila's governance. As China increases its investment abroad
through BRI projects, cooperation between Beijing and Manila will
proliferate (though growing social straining and territorial disputes may
impede these efforts). The rise of China in the Philippines’ politics should
not be an invitation for Washington to distance itself from Manila, but
rather an invitation for the United States to extend its own developmental
faculties in the nation.
As mentioned previously, projects such as the City of Pearl and New Clark
City are not holistically unilateral. Increased engagement has the potential
to lay the groundwork for the empowering of both countries’ economies, a
step towards victory in the war on terror, and increased leverage for both
countries in the global market. With engagement and friendship
prioritized, the framework for a stronger Philippine-United States
relationship may advance through the means of common prosperity for
the peoples of both nations.
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